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CORPORATE LIQUIDATIONS AND THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAX
NORRIS DARRELL t
Today,. instead of setting up corporations, the trend is toward
exterminating them. This is due largely to a steadily increasing cor-
porate tax burden and to growing evidence I that Congress looks with
disfavor upon their unnecessary use. And the trend will not be slowed
by judicial bans recently placed upon their effectiveness as tax-saving
instrumentalities when they serve no business purpose 2 or when they
are merely the alter ego of the stockholders.*
Unlike the transfer of property to a corporation upon its forma-
tion, the reverse process of liquidation has received the statutory bless-
ing of tax exemption most sparingly. Except for liquidations of certain
corporate subsidiaries and liquidations incident to reorganizations, a
liquidation is a taxable transaction 4 even though involving a mere
change in the form of investment from an indirect to a direct interest
in the corporate property.5  Not only is it a taxable transaction, but
Congress, in order to prevent surtax avoidance, has given it special tax
treatment which well deserves reconsideration 6 in the light of practical
realities and the present day need for, and effectiveness of, the safe-
guards thus erected.
The Governing Statutory Provisions and Their Legislative History
The statutory provisions governing corporate liquidations have
had a tortuous legislative history.7 Prior to the Revenue Act of 1916,
the statute merely included "dividends" in taxable income.A In the
tLL. B., 1923, University of Minnesota; member of New York Bar; author of
Discharge of Indebtedness and the Federal ITcomne Tax (1939) 53 H.av. L. REv. 977,
and of other articles in legal periodicals.
i. The evidence includes the elimination of consolidated income tax returns for
business corporations (934), the partial taxation of intercompany dividends (935),
the abandonment of dividend exemption from normal tax (1936) and the drastic pro-
visions applicable to personal holding companies (1934).
2. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465 (935)-
3. Higgins v. Smith, 3o8 U. S. 473 (1940).
4. MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME (1936) 113 et seq. But ingenious attempts to escape
the tax consequences of a straight liquidation are still being made. Coxe v. Handy,
103 F. (2d) 873 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939) ; Trenton Oil Co. v. United States, U. S. D. C.,
E. D. IMich., Dec. 13, 1939.
5. Prescott v. Commissioner, 76 F. (2d) 3 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935); Biechler, 40
B. T. A. 184 (1939) ; Souther, 39 B. T. A. 197 (1939).
6. Limitation of space will not permit discussion here of liquidations incident to
corporate reorganizations, a whole field in itself; or of liquidtions under Supplement
R in obedience to an order under the Public Utility Holding Company Act; or of
liquidations during a consolidated return period.
7. See the excellent discussion of the early problems in Magill, The Income Tax
l iability of Dividends in Liquidation (i925) 23 .MicH. L. REv. 565.
8. Revenue Act of 1913, c. 6, § IIB.
(907)
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Revenue Act of 1916 and all subsequent acts 9 "dividend" was defined
in varying language as meaning any distribution out of earnings or
profits accumulated after February 28, 1913, the present definition
being substantially as expanded in 1936.10 And commencing with the
Revenue Act of 1917, this definition has been supplemented in every
act by a conclusive presumption 11 that the earnings and profits most
recently accumulated are to be deemed distributed first.12 Until the
Revenue Act of 1924, with the exception of the Revenue Act of 1918,
liquidating distributions were not accorded separate treatment, with the
rcbult that distributions even though in partial or complete liquidation
were taxable to stockholders as dividends, exempt from normal tax to
the extent of the earnings and profits accumulated since February 28,
1913, any excess being applied against the basis of the stock in deter-
mining gain or loss from the liquidation."s
The Revenue Act of 1918 changed the policy of taxing liquidating
distributions by treating them as received in exchange for the stock.14
This method of treatment, though abandoned in the Revenue Act of
1921,'5 was -evived and developed in the Revenue Act of 1924; 16 and,
9. Revenue Act of 1916, § 2 (a); Revenue Act of 1917, § 3! (a) Revenue Acts of
19x8, 1921 and i924, § 2oi (a) ; and § 1x (a) of all subsequent acts.
i. INT. REv. CODE § 115 (a) (940). The definition was expanded to include a
distribution "out of the earnings or profits of the taxable year (computed as of the
close of the taxable year without diminution by reason of any distributions made during
the taxable year), without regard to the amount of the earnings and profits at the time
the distribution was made."
ii. The Revenue Act of 1917, § 31 (b), contained a provision, since abandoned,
that distributed profits or surplus "shall be taxed to the distributee at the rates pre-
scribed by law for the years in which such profits or surplus were accumulated by the
corporation. . . ."
12. INT. REv. CooE § iiS (b) (1940).
13. Revenue Act of 1916, A. B. Nickey & Sons, 3 B. T. A. 173 (1925) ; Revenue
Act of 1917, Vincent v. McLaughlin, 6i F. (2d) 657 (1932) ; Dobson, i B. T. A. 1o82
(1925) ; Revenue Act of i9 2I, Commissioner v. Sansome, 6o F. (2d) 93! (C. C. A.
2d, 1932), cert. denied, 287 U. S. 667 (932) ; Phelps v. Commissioner, 54 F. (2d) 289
(C. C. A. 7th, 1931), cert. denied, 285 U. S. 558 (i93i) ; Leland v. Commissioner, So
F. (2d) 523 (C. C. A. ist, 193x). cert. denied, 284 U. S. 656 (x93I) ; Hamilton Woolen
Co., 21 B. T. A. 334 (I93o) ; Haystone Securities Corp., ig B. T. A. 954 ('93o);
Pearson, i6 B. T. A. 1405 (1929) ; Gates, 9 B. T. A. 1133 (z928) ; Darrow, 8 B. T.
A. 276 (i927).
14. Revenue Act of i918, § 201 (C). Under this Act, though the presumption in
§ 201 (b) that earnings are distributed first continued unqualified, it was finally settled
that earnings distributed in liquidation were not taxable as dividends but that the stock-
holder's liquidation gain (i. e., the difference between basis of the stock and the assets
received) constituted "other gains or profits" subject to both normal tax and surtax.
Hellmich v. Hellman, 276 U. S. 233 (928), rezg, 18 F. (2d) 239 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927) ;
Langszaff v. Lucas, 9 F. (2d) 691 (IV. D. Ky., 1925), affd memo., 13 F. (2d) 1022
(C. C. A. 6th, 1926), cert. denied, 273 U. S. 72! (1926).
15. This was done at the instance of the Senate Finance Committee. SF.T. REp.
No. 275 and H. R. No. 486 on the 1921 Revenue Bill, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (i92i),
1939-1 Cum.. BUI.L. 18r, 187, 206, 208 (Part 2). A new §201 (c), the forerunner of
the present Code § 115 (d), was substituted, providing that distributions not out of
e-rnings or pre-March T, 1913 increase in value of property shall be applied against
and reduce the basis of the stock.
16. Revenue Act of 1924, § 2oz (c). The former (c) was continued as (d) but
made inapplicable to !i.idations. For explanation of the Congressional intention, see
H. R. REP. Nos. 179 and 844 and SF-;. R.P. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924);
1939-1 Cu . BUu.. 241, 249, 266, 274, 399 (Part 2).
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though over the years there has been much picking and pricking at
various parts of the statute, it has been continued in all successive acts.
For the ten years preceding the Revenue Act of 1934, a stock-
holder's position on liquidation was precisely the same as if he had sold
the stock, and the statutory provisions regarding capital gains and losses
were equally applicable.1 7 In the 1934 Act, however, Congress, dis-
turbed over possible surtax avoidance through liquidating dividends,"8
amended the statute to provide that liquidation gains must be included
in income in full, 19 despite the more favorable treatment accorded
capital gains under other provisions of the law. The Revenue Act of
1936 excepted from this drastic provision the gain realized from a
liquidation under a plan calling for its completion within two years after
the close of the taxable year within which the first distribution is
made.20  And the present statute, Section 115 (c) of the Internal
Revenue Code, further expands the exception and expresses it in more
elaborate form. 21 Under it, a stockholder's loss on partial or complete
17. White v. United States, 305 U. S. 281 (1938), and Helvering v. Chester N.
Weaver Co., 305 U. S. 293 (1938) (1928 and 1932 Acts). Were it not for the
statutory mandate, liquidating distributions would result in ordinary and not capital
gain or loss, being received in extinguishment of shares and not in exchange therefor.
i& H. R. REP. Nbs. 704 and 1385, SN. REP. No. SA 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934);
1939*- Cum. Buu.. 565, 576, 586, 614, 627 (Part 2).
i9. Revenue Act of i934, § i15 (c). The House Ways and Means Committee Sub-
committee, in order to prevent large stockholders from escaping surtax and relieve
small stockholders from normal tax on liquidating distributions out of earnings, had
recommended "that a liquidating dividend be treated as a sale of the stock, with the
provision that the amount of gain to a shareholder shall be taxed as an ordinary divi-
dend to the extent it represents a distribution of earnings or profits, and as a gain from
sale of property to the extent that it does not represent such a distribution." L R.
REP., 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (Dec. 4, 1933) Ia Cf. Souther, 39 B. T. A. x97 (0939).
2o. The" stated purpose was to remove the brake on liquidations and increase the
revenue. H. R. REP. No. 2475, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (z934) io; 1939-I Cu.. BuLL. 674
(Part 2).
21. INT. REV. CODE § 115 (c) provides in part as follows:"Amounts distributed in complete liquidation of a corporation shall be treated
as in full payment in exchange for the stock, and amounts distributed in partial
liquidation of a corporation shall be treated as in part or full payment in exchange
for the stock. The gain or loss to the distributee resulting from such exchange
shall be determined under section xii, but shall be recognized only to the extent
provided in section ix2. Despite the provisions of section 1Y, the gain so recog-
nized shall be considered as a short-term capital gain, except in the case of
amounts distributed in complete liquidation. For the purpose of the preceding sen-
tence, 'complete liquidation' includes any one of a series of distributions made by a
corporation in complete cancellation or redemption of all of its stock in accordance
with a bona fide plan of liquidation and under which the tiansfer of the property
under the liquidation is to be completed within a time specified in the plan, not
exceeding, from the close of the taxable year during which is made the first of the
series of distributions under the plan, (x) three years. if the first of such series of
distributions is made in a taxable year beginning after December 31, 1937. or (2)
two years. if the first of such series of distributions was made in a taxable year
beginning before January i, 1938. In the case of amounts distributed (whether
before January 1, 1939, or on or after such date) in partial liquidation (other than
a distribution to which the provisions of subsection (h) of this section are appli-
cable) the part of such distribution which is properly chargeable to capital account
shall not be considered a distribution of earnings or profits. .... "
The portion omitted provides that gain on liquidation of certain foreign personal hold-
ing companies, not completed before December 31, 1938, shall be considered as short-
term capital gain.
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liquidation is treated in all respects as on a sale, resulting in a long-term
or short-term capital loss 22 depending on the period he held his stock.
His gain, however, is short-term capital gain, regardless of the holding
period, unless the distributions in liquidation are pursuant to a plan of
complete liquidation under which the liquidation is to be completed
within a time specified in the plan, not to exceed three years from the
close of the taxable year in wliich the first distribution is made.
Apart from statutory provisions of special application that can be
more appropriately discussed later, one further provision should be
noted.23  Since 1924, every Revenue Act has defined a distribution in
partial liquidation so as technically to include (I) each distribution,
whether standing alone or as part of a series of distributions, in com-
plete cancellation of part of the stock and (2) each one of a series of
distributions in complete cancellation of all the stock. 24  For conven-
ience, however, distributions referred to in (2) will be discussed in
connection with complete liquidations, a term which is not defined
except for the purpose of treatment of gain under Section 115 (c),
25
and partia l liquidations will be deemed ordinarily to mean distributions
referred to in (I).
I. PARTIAL LIQUIDATIONS
To determine whether a distribution is in partial liquidation, in the
sense that it is in complete cancellation or redemption of part of the
Under INT. RE V. CoDE § T17 a gain or loss from the sale or exchange of a capi-
tal asset is short-term if the asset was held for not more than i8 months, and long-term
if held for a longer period.
Prior to the Revenue Act of 1936, which imposed the late undistributed profits tax,
the last sentence quoted above, which originated in the Revenue Act of 1924, applied
only for the purpose of determining the source of subsequent distributions. For such
purpose, it has been held that the aggregate amount distributed in partial liquidation
nmst be charged first to capital account (iiicluding therein any pre-February 28, 1913
earnings) to the extent of the capital account behind the retired shares, an apportion-
ment formula being used to determine the proper capital in those situations where the
shares retired had been received as a tax-free dividend. Foster v. United States, 303
U. S. I8 (1938) ; Jarvis, 43 B. T. A. No. 58, Jan. 29, 1941; Horrmann, 34 B. T. A.
1178 (1936) ; Stewart, 29 B. T. A. 8og (i934).
22. This is apparently true even though the liquidation is forced. Ferguson, B. T.
A. memo. op., Oct. 15, 194o; cf. Helvering v. Hammel, 6i Sup. Ct. 368 (1941). But cf.
Munson, 39 B. T. A. 72 (1939).
23. Note also that a special four year statute of limitations is provided with respect
to taxes on distributions in liquidation (INT. REv. CoDE §275 (e)), and special reports
are required (I.T. Ri,.v. CODE § r47 (e)).
24. INT. Rv. CODE § 115 (i) defines "amounts distributed in partial liquidation" as
"a distribution by a corporation in complete cancellation or redemption of a part of its
stock, or one of a series of distributions in complete cancellation or redemption of all
or a portion of its stock." See Notes (1936) 49 HIR. L. REv. 1344; (1938) 47 YALE
L. J. 1146.
25. Section i15 (c) does not define complete liquidation for all purposes but only
"for the purpose of the preceding sentence" which relates to the applicability of the
short-term or long-term capital gain provisions of the Code. A complete liquidation
should therefore retain its status as such for all other tax purposes though not
qualifying under the definition; distributions in partial liquidation in the process of
such a complete liquidation should not be viewed piecemeal for the purpose of the
stockholders' gain or loss. But ef. i Moxi O.iERY, FEDERAL TAX HANDBOOK (1940-
1941) 205.
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stock, is frequently by no means a simple task. A partial liquidation
usually entails a distribution and corresponding reduction of capital,
accompanied at some time before completion by a surrender of some
of the outstanding stock certificates, not necessarily pro rata,26 or by
surrender of all the certificates in exchange for new ones of lesser par
or stated value.27  Since stock certificates are usually considered mere
indicia of ownership, a distribution made in connection with a simple
reduction in par or stated value without physical surrender of stock
certificates should logically be equally as effective, in a proper case, as a
complete cancellation or redemption of part of the stock. Yet, any
attempt to earmark distributions to capital without surrender of stock
certificates may encounter the impenetrable rule that except in liquida-
tion earnings shall be deemed distributed first. 28 And though such a dis-
tribution survives this hurdle so as technically to qualify as a partial
liquidation, it may at least be more susceptible to treatment as a dividend
under Section i 15 (g) discussed below. In cases of this character, it
would therefore be especially appropriate to look beyond the words of
the statute and the physical trafisaction to the background and underly-
ing intent. But the Board of Tax Appeals has adopted a more limited
view and, in order wholly to disqualify such transactions as partial liqui-
dations, has read into the statutory definition the questionable require-
ment that there must be a cancellation or redemption of shares of
stock.2
9
As we have observed, distributions in partial liquidation are treated
as received in exchange for the stock. The stockholder's loss 30 is long-
term or short-term capital loss according to the length of time he held
the stock, but his gain is always a short-term capital gain, taken into
account in full and subject to the graduated surtax rates. A sympa-
thetic Board of Tax Appeals has developed a theory whereby a stock-
holder may sell his stock to the corporation and nevertheless obtain the
26. U. S. Treas. Reg. 1o3, § I9.II5-5; Kelly v. Commissioner, 97 F. (2d) gx5
(C. C. A. 2d, 1938); Britt, 4o B. T. A. 790, af'd, 114 F. (2d) io (C. C. A. 4th, 194o);
Souther, 39 B. T. A. 197 (1939) ; Viault, 36 B. T. A. 430 (937) ; A. H. Cohen Trust,
B. T. A. memo. op., Oct. 7, 1940; Feltex Oil Corp., B. T. A. memo. op., Oct. 1, 1940.
27. Williams, 28 B. T. A. 1279 (1933).
28. Cf. Tate v. Commissioner, 97 F. (2d) 658 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938), cert. doeid,
3o5 U. S. 639; Rheinstrom, Ex'r v. Conner, 33 F. SUpp. 917 (S. D. Ohio i94o);
G. C. M. 8175, 9 IxT. REv. BULL. 134 (Part 2, 1930), IX-2 Cum. BuLL. 134 (i93o).
29. Wilcox, 43 B. T. A. No. 134, March 1, 1941; Stewart, 29 B. T. A. 8o9, 813
(1934), where, however there appeared to have been no bona fide liquidation intent. To
the contrary, see Patty v. Helvering, 98 F. (2d) 717 (C. C. A. 2d, x938), discussed
note 43 infra, whre on appeal the point was apparently conceded to the taxpayer, who
had lost before the Board.
3o. The loss is allowable even though the proportionate interests of the stockhold-
ers remain the same. Kelly v. Commissioner, 97 F. (2d) 915 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938);
Williams, 28 B. T. A. 1279 (933) ; but if the price is nominal or arbitr;ary, the dif-
ference between cost and sale price may be treated as a contribution to capital and
added to the cost of the remaining stock. Taylor v. MacLaughlin, 30 F. Supp. 19 (E.
D. Pa. 1939); Bed Rock Petroleum Co., 29 B. T. A. i8 (1933); cf. Bowes, B. T. A.
memo. op., Nov. 7, 1938.
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benefit of the more favored treatment of long-term capital gains. Con-
sistent with the concepts that a corporation does not reduce capital by
acquiring treasury shares s and may derive profits from dealing in
them,32 the Board has held that if all the shares of a particular stock-
holder are purchased, and if there is no intention to liquidate or cancel
shares or reduce capital and the purchased shares are in fact not retired
but carried in treasury subje& to resale, then the transaction is a sale
and not a distribution "in cancellation or redemption of . . . stock".38
It is not clear to what extent the stockholder's tax status is thus made
dependent upon the corporate purpose; but surely a stockholder's sale
oi, the market should not change its character if the unknown purchaser
happens to be the corporation which buys and retires with a liquidation
intent.
Nevertheless, the discrimination in treatment between sales and
paitial liquidations generally still remains. Its justification, always
difficult for the individual stockholder to perceive, may depend in so
far as partial liquidations are concerned upon the impact of Section
115 (g) of the Code, 34 which was specifically designed to prevent surtax
avoidance in such cases.
Section i15 (g) can best be understood in the light of its history.
It will be recalled that the Revenue Acd of 1921 and all prior acts, except
the Revenue Act of 1918, taxed earnings distributed in liquidation as
dividends. Prior to the 1921 Act, the statute had attempted to tax
stock dividends. In view of the Supreme Court's intervening decision
in Eisnter v. Macomnber,3" the 1921 Act provided for the first time that
stock dividends should not be taxed, and to prevent evasion of surtax
through issuance and redemption of stock dividends it added the fore-
runner of the present Section ii5 (g), applicable only to stock divi-
dends. 6  This provision was carried forward into the 1924 Act with
31. Cf. U. S. Treas. Reg. 64, Arts. 46 and 47 (a); Diamond Alkali Co. v. Dris-
coil, U. S. D. C. W. D. Pa., Feb. 25, 1941 (capital stock tax) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. iog,
§ 30.718-4 (recently enacted excess profits tax).
32. This point is not settled. Cf. Helvering v. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U. S. zio
(1939) ; First Chrold Corp. v. Commissioner, 306 U. S. 117 (1939) ; E. R. Squibb &
Sons v. Helvering, 98 F. (2d) 69 (C. C. A. 2d, z938), modified, io2 F. (2d) 681; U. S.
Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.22 (a)-i6.
33. Smith, 38 B. T. A. 317 (1933), A. and prior NA. withdrawn 1939-2 CUM.
BULL. 34, followed by the Board in at least six memo. decisions; Robinson, 42 B. T. A.
725 (1940). This di.stinction may work to the disadvantage of a stockholder in a fan-
ily corporation where he has a loss. IxT. REv. CoDE § 24 (b) (I) (B).
34. I.N. Rj.v. CODE § 115 (g) provides:
"If a corporation cancels or redeems its stock (whether or not such stock was
issued as a stock dividend) at such time and in such manner as to make the dis-
tribution and cancellation or redemption in whole or in part essentially equivalent
to the distribution of a taxable dividend, the amount so distributed in redemption
or cancellation of the stock, to the extent that it represents a distribution of earn-
ings or profits accumulated after February 28, 1913, shall be treated as a taxable
dividend."
35. 252 U. S. 189 (192o).
36. Revenue Act of r92i, § 2ox (d). The purpose was stated by Mr. McCumber
on the floor of the Senate. 6 CONG. Rc. 7507 (1921).
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minor amendments, "37 its appliation still limited, despite the changed
treatment of liquidation gains, to redemption of stock in connection
with the issuance of stock dividends. But in the Revenue Act of 1926
Congress rectified the omission by expanding the provision as in the
present Section 115 (g) so as to cover cancellations or redemptions of
stock whether or not issued as a stock dividend.38
It seems evident that there was no intention automatically to tax
as an ordinary dividend every distribution of earnings in partial liqui-
dation, for such a purpose could much more easily have been expressed
simply by amending Section 1i 5 (c) instead of speaking in Section
115 (g) vaguely of stock redemptions "at such time and in such manner
as to make the distribution . . . in whole or in part essentially equiva-
lent to the distribution of a taxable dividend." 39
The Treasury Regulations state that applicability of the section
depends on the circumstances of each case; and, though they recognize
that it does not'apply to distributions in complete liquidation, 40 and to
redemption of all the stock of a particular stockholder,41 they evince a
natural administrative tendency to seek its broad enforcement, even
where there is no evidence of tax artifice.
42
For so flexible a statute, reliance on any exactly formulated test
would be to walk on quicksand. The suggestion, recently reiterated,"8
37. Revenue Act of rgz4, § 2o (f). The principal amendment extended the pro-
vision to cover stock dividends whether issued before or after the redemption. The
need for this change is illustrated by Bryan, 2o B. T. A. 573 (I93o).
38. The purpose of the change is brought out and illustrated in H. R. REP. Nos. i
and 356, and SEN. Rm. No. 52 on the Revenue Bill of 1926, 6gth Cong., 1st Sess.
(x925), i939- CUM. BULtL 315, 318, 332, 344, 361 (Part 2).
.39. Cf. I.a. REV. CODE § 112 (c) (2), which simply provides that a distribution of
cash and non-exempt property in connection with a reorganization shall be taxed as a
dividend if it "has the effect" of a taxable dividend. Love, 39 B. T. A. 172 (i939),
aff'd, 113 F. (2d) 236 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940).
40. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § i9.ii5-9; Congr. Committee Reports on the Revenue
Bill of 1926, note 38 supra. This exception is recognized in Boehringer, 29 B. T. A. 8
(x933), and some of the cases cited in succeeding notes.
41. U. S. Treas. Reg. 1o3, § i9."s-g. Cf. Flinn, 37 B. T. A. io85 (1938). Under
earlier acts which exempted inter-company dividends from tax, the section was also
held inapplicable where the sole stockholder was a corporation. Palmetto Quarries
Co., 3o B. T. A. s44 (i934); Salt Lake Hardware Co., 27 B. T. A. 482 (1932). But
cf. Commissioner v. Forhan Realty Corp., 75 F. (2d) 268 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
42. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 115-9 contains this statcment: "A cancellation or re-
demption by a corporation of a portion of its stock pro rata among all the shareholders
will generally be considered as effecting a distribution essentially equivalent to a di-i-
dend distribution to the extent of the earnings and profits accumulated after February
28, 1913." The breadth of this language finds some support in the Committee Reports
accompanying the 1926 Revenue Bill, note 38 supra.
43. Patty v. Helvering, o8 F. (2d) 7M7 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938). On appeal the issue
before the Board, viz., the effectiveness as a partial liquidation of a reduction in par
value and a corresponding distribution without physical surrender of stock, was appar-
ently conceded to the taxpayer who lost below, and § ix5 (g) was raised but held inap-
plicable. The court seems erroneously to have thought (i) that under the 1928 Act a
distribution in partial liquidation was always taxable as a dividend to the extent of
accumulated earnings; (ii) that a non-taxable stock dividend impounds and reduces
earnings available for subsequent distribution; and (iii) accordingly that § ii5 (g)
applies only when the stock redeemed was issued with the intention of distributing
earnings thus impounded without surtax.
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that it carves out an exception to the general rule only where the shares
retired were not originally issued for bona fide business purposes, seems
unnecessarily restrictive in the light of the legislative history.44 A
sounder rule, if any attempt at statement dare be ventured, would seem
to be this: When for no genuine corporate business reason stock-
holders work out a scheme to siphon out available corporate funds with-
out surtax by turning in part 6f their stock, they should be taxed as on
an ordinary dividend to the extent the distribution does not exceed the
accumulated post-February 28, 1913 earnings, where their proportion-
ate interests in the company remain substantially unchanged and where
the result is approximately the same as if a dividend had been paid.
On the other hand, the retirement of stock for a sound corporate busi-
ness reason, such as in consequence of sale of assets and an actual
business contraction, should not be so treated, even though the corpora-
tion had substantial accumulated earnings.
While not laying down this test, most of the decisions, a surprising
number of which involved closed corporations that issued and later
redeemed stock dividends, 45 can be justified under it. 6 In applying
the statute, a number of factors are taken into account, such as the
circumstances of issuance and acquisition of the stock, the time of
redemption, the source and availability of cash for redemption, the past
dividend record, the effect of the redemption on the stockholders' pro-
portionate interests, the degree of control exercised by the stockholders
whose shares are redeemed and, above all, the legitimacy of the reasons
for redemption in lieu of an ordinary dividend. The courts and the
Board, whose determination of fact is customarily accepted, do not
always go the full length desired by the Commissioner 47 and, as may
be expected, there is room for differences of opinion in many of the
close factual situations that arise.
44. Nevertheless some support for this limited view can be found elsewhere. *See
particularly, Commissioner v. Quackenbos, 78 F. (2d) I56 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935); Com-
missioner v. Cordingly, 78 F. (2d) 118 (C. C. A. ist, I935) ; Kelly v. Commissioner,
97 F. (ad) 915 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938), which may, however, be justified on other grounds.
45. The result may be different for one who purchased the redeemed dividend stock
than for the original holder. Parker v. United States, 88 F. (2d) 9o7 (C: C. A. 7th,
1937).
46. It has been said that no actual bad faith or tax artifice need be shown: %fc-
Guire v. Commissioner, 84 F. (2d) 431 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936), cert. denied, 2W U. S.
59r ; Peet. 43 B. T. A. No. 123, 'arch 11, 1941; Grimditch, 37 B. T. A. 402 (1938).
But ci. Commissioner v. Rockwood, 82 F. (2d) 359 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936); that the
redemption need not he precisely pro rata: Grimditch, 37 B. T. A. 402 (1938) ; Nat-
wick, 36 B. T. A. P66 (1937) ; and that it is not enough that the redemption be actu-
ated by a legitimate reason of the controlling stockholder--corporate justifiecation must
be shown: Flanagan v. Helvering, i16 F. (2d) 937 (App. D. C. 1940) ; Levit, 43 B. T.
A. No. 147, March 21, 194t. But cf. Flinn, 37 B. T. A. 1o85 (938) ; Girard Trust Co.,
32 B. T. A. 926 (1935) ; Peet, 43 B. T. A. No. z23, March I, 1941.
47. The govermuent has been victorious less than half the time. The cases are
largely collected in Flanagan v. Itelvering, 1i6 F. (2d) 937 (App. D. C. i94o) ; Notes
(1936) 49 HARV. L. Rvv. 1344, (938) 47 YALE L. J. 1146, 1157; (1936) 1o5 A. L R.
774; I PAUL & "MERTENS, LAw OF FEDFRAL INCOM E TAXATION, and M TE-NS' 1939
Cums. Supp. §8.io9 et scq.
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II. COMPLETE LIQUIDATIONS TAXABLE TO STOCKHOLDERS
Ordinarily, complete liquidation means to make liquid, to convert
assets into cash and distribute the net proceeds to the stockholders after
settling the debts.48 The statute, however, speaks of liquidation simply
in terms of distributions (in whatever form) in cancellation or redemp-
tion of stock, a test which surprisingly often has been difficult to apply
when distributions are spread over a period of years and the stock
certificates are not immediately surrendered.
A. D;stinction between Ordinary Dividends and Distributions in
Liquidation
The determination of whether a particular corporate distribution
is an ordinary dividend or one of a series of distributions in cancellation
or redemption of stock is one of fact. The intent and purpose is con-
trolling, but this is determined objectively with the view toward placing
the distribution in the category where it really belongs, not where the
corporation or its stockholders sought to make it appear to be. 49
It is not necessary that stock certificates be physically surrendered
for cancellation against the distributioni or that the corporation be dis-
solved, 10 or that state law be otherwise complied with. The form of
the corporate resolutions is not controlling. These are but evidentiary
facts to be considered in connection with all the surrounding circum-
stances. Of greater weight are the answers to realistic inquiries such
as these: Was the distribution made out of the proceeds of sale of
corporate assets, or out of accumulated cash? How did it compare
with current earnings and -the past dividend reco'd? What was its
effect upon capital? Did the corporation continue to engage in business
after the distribution, or were its activities limited to the winding up of
its affairs? Did the stockholders intend to maintain the corporation as
a going concern, or was there an intent to quit? In the determination
of the facts, the Board's findings are almost invariably accepted as
supported by substantial evidence.
The decisions holding distributions to be ordinary dividends
though declared as liquidating distributions usually involved attempts
to earmark to capital the source of the distribution or to effect a tax-
free distribution of accumulated surplus, where the corporation con-
48. Salt Lake Hardware Co, 27 B. T. A. 482 (1932); Guild, ig B. T. A. 1186
(1930).
49. The approach, is not unlike that involved in the familiar problem of domicile.
Cf. Tweed and Sargent, Death and Taxes are certain-But What of Domicile (1939)
53 HAM. L. REv. 68, 88.
So. There may be a complete liquidation even though the corporation is continued
wsith a new business. Kennemer v. Commissioner, 96 F. (2d) 177 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938) ;
Ward M. Canaday, Inc., 76 F. (2d) 278 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S.
612 (z935) ; Kent Oil Co., 38 B. T. A. 528 (z938).
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tinued in business and actually retired none of its stock."' The decisions
holding distributions to be in liquidation 5 2 though in form declared as
ordinary dividends may be grouped according to their principal dis-
tinguishing characteristics. One group, usually involving the question
of. dividend exemption from normal tax under the earlier law, inclades
those cases in which the assets used in the regular business had been
sold prior to the declaration 'of" the so-called dividend, and the sums
distributed, always extraordinary in amount and usually equal to a sub-
stantial portion, if not all or more, of the accumulated surplus, were
paid in full or in large part from the proceeds of sale. These trans-
actions really amounted to the distribution of proceeds, of disposing of
the corporation's business-a very different thing from a distribution
of current earnings.53 Another group, likewise involving the question
of dividend exemption from normal tax, includes those cases in which
the extraordinary size of the purported dividend-intended to be equiv-
alent to or greater than the entire accumulated surplus--rendered it
almost impossible to avoid the conclusion that the distribution was
really intended as part of the liquidation and would not have been
made but for the plan to liquidate.54 Finally, there are the recent Board
of Tax Appeals decisions, involving the declaration, almost coincident
with the adoption of a plan of liquidation under Section I 12 (b) (6),
of a dividend out of current earnings for the purpose of avoiding pos-
sible liability for undistributed profits tax, no payment of the dividend
being made except at the time of distribution in complete liquidation."
The broad test laid down in most of these cases is whether there
existed at the time the dividend was declared a general manifest inten-
tion, not necessarily a definitely adopted plan, to liquidate completely.
Yet where a dividend, not in excess of the current year's earnings
51. See, e. g., Estate of Rudolph F. Rabe, 25 B. T. A. 1242 (1932); Guild, xg B.
T. A. 1186 ('93o). But cf. Bynum v. Commissioner, 13 F. (2d) i (C. C. A. 5th,
i94o) and Commissioner v. Straub, 76 F. (2d) 388 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935), where slow,
complete liquidations were held to be in process. Cf. also cases cited notes 28 and 29
supra.
52. For early decisions involving interpretation of the Revenue Act of i918, see
note 14 supra.
53. Kennemer v. Commissioner, 96 F. (2d) 177 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938); Holmby
Corp. v. Commissioner, 83 F. (2d) 548 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936) ; Ward M. Canaday, Inc.,
76 F. (2d) 278 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935), cert. denied, zfi U. S. 612 (1935); Gossett v.
Commissioner, 59 F. (2d) 365 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932), rehearing denied, 6o F. (2d) 484
(1932); Tootle v. Commissioner, 58 F. (2d) 576 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932); Rollestone
Corp., 38 B. T. A. 1093 (1938); Monk, 29 B. T. A. 556 (933); Bacharach, 29 B. T.
A. 282 (x933) ; Wood, 27 B. T. A. 162 (932) ; cf. Northern Trust Co, Trustee, 2o
B. T. A. 866, aff'd sub nom., Phelps v. Commissioner, 54 F. (2d) 289 (C. C. A. 7th,
1930, cert. denied, 285 U. S. 558; G. C. M. 8623, IX-2 Cu.m. BuLL. 164 (1930).
54. Canal-Commercial Trust & Savings Bank v. Commissioner, 63 F. (2d) 61g
(C. C. A. 5th, 1933), cert. denied, 29o U. S. 628; Gores, B. T. A. memo. op., Feb. x8,
i941; Kent Oil Co., 38 B. T. A. 528 (1938); New Orleans Compress Co., Inc., B. T.
A. memo. op., Sept. x8, 1935; Blumenthal, 12 B. T. A. 1205 (1928); Dandridge, ii
B. T. A. 421 (1928).
55. Asheville Ctizen-Times Co. and The Biltmore Co., B. T. A. memo. ops., Oct.
a5, x94o. To similar effect see Gaston & Co., 39 B. T. A. 640 (i939), a personal hold-
ing company case arising under 1934 law,
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available for distribution and of the sort customarily payable though
there were no liquidation, is declared and paid before any plan of com-
plete liquidation is definitely adopted, and is reported as such both by
the corporation and the stockholders, much can be said in favor of
treating it as an ordinary dividend, even though complete liquidation
was in contemplation and shortly follows"
B. Time of Realzation of Stockholder's Gain or Loss on Complete
Liquidation
Since distributions in liquidation are deemed received by the stock-
holder in exchange for his stock, the stockholder is entitled to a return
of the basis for his shares before he realizes any gain. Gain occurs and
is taxed only as and when distributions in excess of basis are received,
irrespective oi the time of dissolution or of the niceties of title under
state law."' The theory is that the entire liquidation transaction,
though involving a series of distributions in partial liquidation tied
together in one plan, is a single exchange transaction. The result is
that, as in the case of an ordinary sale Involving deferred payments, the
stockholder must recover his basis before he has a gain. It makes no
difference when he surrenders his shares. The plan must be viewed as
a whole; and intervening steps, such as the surrender of certain shares
on successive distributions, will neither make each step a closed trans-
action nor serve to produce a gain or loss in the amount of the difference
between the basis of the particular shares surrendered and the distribu-
tion received thereagainst.38
In the case of a loss, the general principles governing the time of
allowance of losses control. There must be an identifiable event justi-
fying the deduction of a loss in the year claimed. The corporation need
not be stripped of all assets before a loss deduction can be taken, though
56. Cf. Gossett v. Commissioner, 59 F. (2d) 385 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932), and Canal-
Commercial Trust & Savings Bank v. Commissioner, 63 F. (2d) 619 (C. C. A. 5th,
1933), cert. denicd, 29o U. S. 628 (i933), where periodical dividends in customary
amounts were concededly treated as ordinary dividends though declared after corporate
approval of proposals to dissolve. See also Helvering v. Edison Securities Corp, 78
F. (2d) 85 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935); T. H. Symington & Son, Inc., 35 B. T. A. 711, 756
(1937); Deposit, Trust & Savings Bank, Ex'r, ii B. T. A. 7o6 (z928) ; Perry, 9 B.
T. A. 796 (1927), where distributions were considered ordinary dividends though dis-
solution was generally anticipated. Bul cf. Texas Empire Pipe Line Co., 42 B. T. A.
3(A (1940).
57. See, e. g., Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., et at. v. Blair, 26 F. (ad)
532 (App. D. C. 1928); Kirby, 35 B. T. A. 5A, 6oo (1937), r ezd on other growds,
1o2 F. (2d) ir5 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939) ; Hatfield, 32 B. T. A. 1 935) ; National Gro-
cery Co., B. T. A. memo. op., Feb. 13, x939; and cases cited. See also notes 8o and 81infra.5. T. T. Word Supply C., 41 B. T. A. 965 (194o); Cooledge, 4o B. T. A. xio,
uiS (1939) ; Ludorff, et at., Ex'rxs, 40 B. T. A. 32 (1939); Symington & Son, Inc., 35
B. T. A. 711, 755 (x937); Quinn, 35 B. T. A. 412 (i937) ; Letts v. Commissioner, 84
F. (2d) 76a (C. C. A. 9th, 1936). The fcregoing cases involved stock that was all of
one class.
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where the stock has any value almost as much has been required.5' It
would seem, however, that the reservation of a comparatively small
amount in cash to meet expenses or contingent liabilities would not
postpone the loss.0e
C. Complete Liquidation under Section ir15 (c).
If the corporate stockholders are individuals, their stock has been
held over eighteen months, and a gain will be realized by them on the
liquidation, it is ordinarily to their advantage that the liquidation
qualify if possible as a "complete liquidation" under Section x5 (c)
of the Code.61 Otherwise they will iose the benefit of the long-term
capital gain provisions of Section 117 to which they would be entitled
if they had made a bona fide sale of their stock. If the stockholders
include corporations, qualification under Section xi 5 (c) may be impor-
tant because of the difference in treatment of short-term and long-term
capital gains and losses, not only for ordinary income tax purposes but
also under the excess profits tax provisions of the Second Revenue Act
of 1940.82
To qualify under Section -i15 (c), a plan must be adopted specify-
ing the time within which the liquidation is to be completed. The
distributions may be spread over four years; but, where the stock has
been held over eighteen months and the stockholders would have the
advantage of the limited tax rates now imposed on long-term capital
gains, there may be important reasons for completing the liquidation in
one year where practicable. The stockholder's gain or loss depends on
the value of the assets at the time of distribution, an important con-
sideration where the assets are subject to market fluctuation and are to
be distributed in kind. Moreover, tax rates may be changed, or the tax
law otherwise amended, affecting the tax consequences to stockholders
from distributions in future years. The advantage of knowing in
59. A long line of cases and rulings culinating in Dresser v. United States, 55 F.
(2d) 499 (Ct. Cl. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U. S. 635 (1932), suggest that the loss is
deductible "in the year in which it may appear that the taxpayer has received from the
property all that it is possible for him to receive". Cf. Harris, 43 B. T. A. No. oo,
Feb. 26, 194. No distinction between taxpayers on a cash and on an accrual basis has
been clearly drawn.
6o. See Commissioner v. Winthrop, 98 F. (2d) 74 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938), accepted
G. C. M. 21966, 1940-I Cu. t. BULL. i3o, revoking G. C. M. 14207, XIV-8 um. BuLt.
68 (1935), loss allowed, as sufficiently definite and certain, where the corporation re-
served cash approximating 2o cents per share over and above estimated taxes and
di-solution expenses and issued certificates entitling the stockholders to the avails of
those small funds.
6r. For the determination of the gain to be taken into account where the stock was
acquired at different times, see Cooledge, 40 B. T. A. 11o (1939) ; U. S. Treas. Reg.
103, § 19.!15-5; G. C. M. 20826, 1938-2 Cult. BULL. 202.
62. Long-term capital gains and losses are excluded, and short-term capital gains
and losses are included, in calculating average base period net income and excess profits
tax net income. Second Revenue Act of i94o, § 711.
CORPORATE LIQUIDATIONS AND THE INCOME TAX
advance with reasonable certainty the approximate ultimate dollars and
cents tax liability from the liquidation may well offset in many cases
the advantage of tax postponement, or the possibility of a lower future
tax liability through depreciation of assets, offsetting losses, reduced tax
rates or otherwise.68
On the other hand, such haste may be impractical, unwise, or
impossible, especially in the case of publicly held companies. Assets
may be slow to liquidate and may realize more for the stockholders if
liquidation is gradual and not forced. Contingent liabilities and back
taxes frequently require time for settlement, and retention of a reserve
to meet them may simply delay completion of the liquidation. The
assets may include a substantial and meritorious Federal tax refund
claim, the successful prosecution of which might be expected to extend
over many years.6 4 And, if the stockholders are numerous and widely'
scattered, there is the question whether the mere deposit with an agent
designated by the corporation of the stockholders' distributive shares
for delivery to them upon surrender of their stock certificates constitutes
a distribution in complete cancellation or redemption of the stock. 5
The advantage to the stockholders, where gain is involved, of a
liquidation plan qualifying under Section 11i 5 (c) stimulates the adop-
tion of such plans and thereby tends to reduce litigation over the exist-
ence of a status of liquidation. The four-year requirement, however,
has the practical effect of injecting tax considerations into matters of
business judgment, of discriminating between complete liquidations on
the basis of the time element without regard to surtax avoidance, and
probably, in many cases, of making the tax treatment of intermediate
63. In addition, to spread over several years the liquidation of a personal holding
company which realizes income in the interim would raise the serious problem, similar
to that under the late undistributed profits tax law, of a dividends paid credit under
I.iT. REv. CODE § 27 (g) to offset the drastic surtax on undistributed income under INT.
REV. CODE § 500. It is unsettled whether for this purpose distributions in complete
liquidation are chargeable first to capital, first to earnings, or proportionately to both.
It is doubtful that an analogy to the treatment of such distributions to the stockholders
can fairly be drawn. See in this connection notes 21 and 58 sura; Ercr. REv. Coo
§ 115 (a), (b) and (c); I. T. 3o67, 1937-I Cum. BuL. 9X; U. S. Treas. Reg. 103,
§§ 19.27 (g)-1 (b) and xg.xxS-ii; Patty v. Commissioner, 98 F. (2d) 717 (C. C. A. 2d,
1938) ; Harter v. Helvering, 79 F. (2d) 12 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) ; McCaughn v. Mc-
Cahan, 39 F. (2d) 3 (C. C. A. 3d. 1930) ; A. B. Nickey & Sons, 3 B. T. A. 173 (1925).
64. 35 STAT. 411 (igo8), 31 U. S. C. A. §203 (1927), prohibits sale of the claim,
but it could be transferred to the stockholders in liquidation (Novo Trading Corp. v.
Commissioner, 113 F. (2d) 320 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940); Kingan & Co.. Inc. v. United
States. 44 F. (2d) 447 (Ct. Cl. 193o)). or to the survivor in a consolidation or merger
(Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 256 U. S. 655 (192)), or to liquidating
trustees (cf. Western Pacific R. R. v. United States, 268 U. S. 271 (1925) and cases
cited).
65. The test should not be purely technical. Cf. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.115-5
and xg.i 5-i; Commissioner v. Scatena, 85 F. (2d) 729 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936); Estate
of Daniel Shay, B. T. A. mqmo. op., April 27, 1940; Edwards, zo B. T. A. 39 (1928).
A somewhat comparable problem, involving also gain or loss to the corporation, arises
when scrip for fractional shares is issued in cnnnection with a distribution of securities
in kind, the shares to be sold if the scrip is :unt surrcndered for combination into full
shares -ithin a specified time.
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distributions in excess of basis dependent upon subsequent events, i. e.,
success in carrying out the plan.0 6
D. Liquidation Distributions in Kind
I. To PREFERRED AND COMMON STOCKHOLDERS DIRECTLY: For
many years Treasury Regulations 67 have unequivocally stated:
"No gain or loss is realized by a corporation from the mere dis-
tribution of its assets in kind in partial or complete liquidation,
however they may have appreciated or depreciated in value since
their acquisition." 68
Moreover, a long list of cases involving liquidating distributions in kind
to common stockholders can be cited to the same effect.09 While it is
hardly likely that the question of corporate gain on a liquidating dis-
tribution of appreciated property will give rise to serious concern so
long as the present Treasury policy continues, 70 tax law is not static
and the problem deserves brief attention in the light of recent develop-
ments.
In General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering,71 the Depart-
ment of Justice, in hard pursuit of victory,1 2 produced before the
Supreme Court a new and secret weapon not utilized below, namely,
66. Note, however, that, unlike Ih'r. REv. CODE § 112 (b) (6), § ItS (c) speaks
merely of a plin calling for the liquidation to be completed within a specified time,
Aithout stating the consequences of failure to do so.
67. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.22 (a)-21, first adopted in substantially the same
language in U. S. Treas. Reg. 69 (1926), Art. 548.
68. Gain or loss to the corporaticn is, however, recognized upon the distribution of
irttallnxnt obligatikcs in a taxable liquidation. 1.xT. REv. CODE § 44 (d) ; U. S. Treas.
Reg. 103, § 19.44-5.
69. Ste, e. g., Stock Yards Bank of Cincinnati, 25 B. T. A. 964 (1932) ; Gould, 21
B. T. A. ,'21 (103o) ; Hlouston Pros. Co., 21 B. T. A. 8o4 (1930) ; W. P. Fox & Sons,
Inc., 15 B. f". A. 115 (:9) ; Ilolknberg 'Music Co., 6 B. T. A. 421 (1927) ; Jemison,
3 B. T. A. 72o (i9.6) ; Dill Mfg. Co., 39 B. T. A. 1023 (1939) ; Souther, 39 B. T. A.
197 (1939).
70. The Regulation may now have the force of law, at least for as long as it re-
mairs unch-tged. Sce Griswold, A Suminar3 of the Regu!ations Problem (1941) 54
HAv. I. Av. 398. and other recent law review articles therein cited.
71. 296 U. S. 20 (1935), rc,'g, 74 F. (2d) 972 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935), r-'g, 29
B. T. A. 034 (1934).
72. The corporation had declared a dividend in money but in the same resolution
had providetd for its payment in appreciated secarities. The Board held the dividend
lc'olutinn irlivisible, effecting the declaration of a dividend in kind. The court agreed
with the Board, but held for the Government on a newly raised issue. (See note 87
iira.) The taxpayer obtained certiorari, and in the Smipreine Court the Department
.f Justice raised the third point, referred to in the text. The Supreme Court agreed
with the decisions below on the first point, reversed on the second point because not
raised 1,cow, and ignored the third point possibly for the same reason, tnless covered
by the brief decision on the first point, that "Both tribunals below rightly decided that
petitioner deried ro taxable gain from the distribution among its stockholders of
the . . . shares as a dividend. This was no sale; assets were not used to discharge
indebte~lness." For similar decisions, see Commissioner v. Columbia Pacific Shipping
Co. 77 F. (2d) 759 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935) ; First Savings Bank of Ogden v. Burnet, 53
F. (21) 919 (App. D. C. 1931) ; Corporate Investment Co., 4o B. T. A. tm56 (i939)
Virginia Beach Golf Course Annex Corporation, 23 B. T. A. 1170 (1931).
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that a corporation realizes income by distributing appreciated property
as an ordinary dividend in kind. It urged that an ordinary dividend
in kind is a closed transaction, involving a utilization of the appreciation
in value for corp6rate purposes and a satisfaction of a general liability
to account to stockholders, and that it accordingly constitutes a "sale or
other disposition'" under Section i i x (b) of the statute. The Depart-
ment conceded in its brief that liquidating distributions in kind, as
capital transactions, do not give rise to gain or loss to the corporation.
Yet, especially where capital is intact, it is difficult to perceive any real
difference between the degree of benefit or satisfaction received by the
corporation whether the appreciated property is distributed as an ordi-
nary dividend or as a distribution in partial or complete liquidation.73
In either case the corporation makes use of the appreciation to meet
responsibilities of a sort included in the stockholders' bundle of rights.
The Department's new artillery proved ineffective in the Supreme
Court,7 4 but there is an ominous sound to the broad language recently
used by that court in Helvering v. Horst.75 There a bondholder was
held taxable on a bond coupon clipped and given to his son before
maturity, but the decision was not rested upon the continued ownership
by the taxpayer of the bond which produced the income.76 The Court,
adopting the "satisfaction" as distinguished from the "realization".
concept of income toward which during recent years it has been lean-
ing, reasoned that the requirement of realization is merely an adminis-
tratively convenient rule to postpone tax until the final event of enjoy-
ment and that such an event may occur when the taxpayer "has made
such use or disposition of his power to receive .or control the income
as to procure in its place other tatisfactions which are of economic
worth," satisfactions "procurable only by the expenditure of money
or money's worth." " This reasoning strengthens the argument that a
corporation, which chooses to distribute appreciated property to its
stockholders rather than to reach a similar economic result 7 by selling
the property at a profit and distributing the proceeds to them in cash,
has realized a taxable satisfaction. Yet it is one thing to apply such
73. See comment to this effect in First Savings Bank of Ogden v. Burnet, 53 F.
(2d) gig (App. D. C. 1931).
74. See note 72 supra.
75. 311 U. S. 112 (1940), 89 U. OF PA. L. REv. 532; cf. Rhodes, 43 B. T. A. No.
110 (1941).
76. The decisions in the Horft and companion case decided the same day (Hcl-
'erbi'g T. Eubank, involving taxability of assigned renewal commissions) seemingly
were deliberately placed upon the broad grounds discussed in the text, the property
ownership distinction formerly in vogue being apparently abandoned. See (1941) 41
COL. L. Ray. 34o; (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 5z8, 519. For an ancient view, see People, ex
rel. Brewster v. Wendell, i96 App. Div. 613, i88 N. Y. Supp. 51o (1921). See Har-
rison v. Schaffner, U. S. Sup. Ct. March 31, 1941.
77. 311 U. S. 112, I6, 117 (1940).
78. See AfAGiLL, TAXABLE INCOME (z936) 52.
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reasoning to collect a full tax and frustrate a tax-dodging scheme such
as was involved in the Horst case, and another to use it to produce a
double tax in a liquidation transaction in which the stockholders are
admittedly taxable on the full value of the distributed property. How-
ever that may be, if a corporation procures a taxable satisfaction from
distributing appreciated property, it should suffer a deductible dis-
satisfaction if the property it'distributes has depreciated in value.
Liquidating distributions to preferred stockholders may raise
slightly different problems. While corporate charters entitle preferred
stockholders to a specified sum of money upon dissolution and liquida-
tion, the Treasury Regulation draws no distinction between preferred
and common stock. And there should be none,79 because ordinarily
the common stockholders are also paid in cash upon dissolution; in
neither case is there a debt in a technical sense. Yet, under a develop-
ing income tax law,80 there are inherent tax possibilities in the situation
where a preferred stockholder agrees to accept appreciated assets after
the corporation has been dissolved, or his preferred stock has been
redeemed, and his sole right under the charter and state law is to receive
cash.
2. To TRUSTEE FOR STOCKHOLDERS: Frequently a distribution in
kind to the stockholders directly is not feasible. The stockholders may
be many or widely scattered and the assets not susceptible of easy sale
or exact division. The books are full of cases,"' most but not all 82
of which involved attempts to avoid corporate tax on imminent sale
to outsiders, holding ineffective as a complete liquidation a transfer
of the corporate assets to principal stockholders or others designated
by the corporation, or by vote of stockholders as a corporate body,
where the persons receiving the property are obliged to perform essen-
tially the same functions as liquidating trustees. Under state law, when
79. See Mcurer Steel Barrel Co., Inc., ii B. T. A. 584 (T928), aff'd per curian,
35 F. (2d) io19 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929); Liberty Agency Co., 5 B. T. A. 778 (1926);
L.iquidating Co., 33 B. T. A. 1173, 1185 (936).
go. See, e. g., Kenin, et aL., Trustees v. Commissioner, 114 F. (2d) 217 (C. C. A.
.2d, i94o) ; .ui inan v. Eaton, 15 F. Supp. 113, aft'd per rur-am, 83 F. (2d) 1o19 (C. C.
A. 2d, i9. -6), - rt. dcnied, 299 U. S. 573; Ewing, 4o B. T. A. 912 (1939), holding gain
realized v,,,n 0i e zatisfactuon with appreciated propetty of a legacy payable in cash, or
in ca i or prc,;crty. B:t cf. Mesta, 4- B. T. A. 933 (1940), involving a family settle-
mont. The corporate charter might, oi course, be amended in advance of the adoption
of any liquidation plan.
81. See, e. L., First National Banl of Greeley v. United States, 86 F. (2d) 938
(C. C. A. ioth, r936) ; Tazewell Electric Light & Power Co. v. Strother, 84 F. (ad)
327 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1936), ccrt. 1. niced, Oct. z8, 1935; Nocona Cotton Seed Oil Co., 42
B. T. A. 1172 (1940) ; Caswcll, 36 13. r. A. 8M6 (0037), and cases cited; also cases
cited note 57 s:lfra ; cf. Envoy Petroleumn Co. v. Rog;an, U. S. D. C. S. D. Cal., Aug. 9,
9.;o; C,.n- rtive Gas Co., 30 B. T. A. 552 (1934); The Chalet, Inc., B. T. A.
memo. op., Feb. 27, 1941. •
82. See, e. g., Whitney Realty Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 8o F. (2d) 429 (C. C. A.
6th, 1935), cert. d,'ni cd, 298 U. S. 668 (1936) ; Smith, 26 B. T. A. 1178 (1932).
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a corporation is dissolved the corporate directors normally constitute
trustees to wind up its affairs. Treasury Regulations have long pro-
vided for corporate tax on transactions by trustees in dissolution, on
the theory that they act for the corporation. 8A3 The primary function
of a trustee in dissolution is to collect assets, convert them into cash,
pay the debts and distribute the balance to the stockholders. Any
trustee performing these functions, whoever he may be, comes peril-
ously close to the status of a corporate agent even though the purpose
is not to avoid tax on a contemplated sale.
But when the corporate debts and affairs have been settled, it
should be possible to effect a complete liquidation by distributions in
kind to trustees, if the stockholders individually, and not by a per-
centage vote at a stockholders' meeting, separately appoint a common
trustee " to receive the assets to which they are respectively entitled.
The Board of Tax Appeals has so held in a case that lacked the tax
avoidance coloring of an immediately contemplated sale and of pre-
existing corporate sale negotiations.85
3. EFFECT OF PREEXISTING CORPORATE NEGOTIATIONS FOR SALE:
It is a healthy requirement that a liquidation in kind designed to avoid
a corporate tax on sale of the assets should bear the utmost scrutiny.
Yet if the policy of the law is to. permit distribution of assets without
gain or loss to the corporation, a line should fairly be drawn between
those distributions which are really what they purport to be and those
which merely masquerade as such.
If the corporation makes a binding contract of sale before the
distribution, the distributees would receive the assets, not as stock-
holders receiving distributions which they may do with as they see fit,
but as mere conduits or agents with no choice other than to carry out
the commitment of the corporation.8" If the corporation makes an
absolute unqualified legal distribution to the stockholders individually,
leaving them free to hold or dispose of the assets according to the
dictates of their independent judgment, the corporation should not be
83. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.52-2, and corresponding prior regulations including
Reg. 45 (1918), Art. 622. The same result follows whether a legal or de facto cor-
.oration or an association is deemed to exist.
84. Such an arrangement should not constitute an association, taxable as a corpora-
tion. Cf. Everts, 38 B. T. A. io39 (938); Stantex Petroleum Co., 38 B. T. A. 269
(1938) ; Johnston, 38 B. T. A. 1199 (1938).
85. Central N¢ational Bank. Trustee, 25 B. T. A. r123 (1932), where tax liabilities
remained unsettled; cf. First National Bank of Greeley v. Unitcd States, 86 F. (2d)
938 (C. C. A. xoth, 1936). In Conservative Gas Co., 3o B. T. A. 552 (r934), the
corporation was freed from tax on a sale made by a trustee appointed by vote at a
stockholders' meeting, because of the absence of corporate sale negotiations.
86. Liberty Service Corp. v. Commissioner, 77 F. (2d) 94 (C. C. A. 3d, 1925);
Mary C. Marshall Realty Co., 29 B. T. A. 241 (i933); Nace Realty Co., 28 B. T. A.
467 (1933), affd pcr curiam, C. C. A. 6th, April 13, i935-
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taxed on a subsequent sale even though it had conducted some negotia-
tions for sale before the distribution8
7
If the stockholders themselves individually initiate and conduct
the negotiations for sale and make the sale contract, bringing about
a liquidation of their corporation in order to enable them to perform,
it should make no difference (though the Board has recently indicated
a contrary view Is) whether they made the contract before or after
the liquidation. In either case, they are acting as independently as
does any seller who contracts to sell something he expects and is in a
position to acquire; the corporation has nothing to do with the sale.
To say that the stockholders in s(Tch a case are mere agents of the cor-
poration in effecting the sale would be unreal.8 '
E. Corporate Indebtedness
Rarely do-s a corporation approach liquidation without current or
funded debts and contingent liabilities. If the stock is closely held, an
assumption of debts by the stockholders is commonly resorted to in
order to simplify the liquidation and avoid difficulties. Any debts to
the stockholders themselves are cancelled.
From the standpoint of the stockholders, corporate taxes and
other indebtedness subsequently paid by the stockholders is commonly
treated as a reduction of the amount received in liquidation." From
the standpoint of the corporation, however, the assumption or can-
cellation of debt by the stockholders in a liquidation has usually been
87. In General Utilities & Opcrating Co. v. Helvering, z96 U. S. 2oo (1935), the
Supreme Court reversed the holdir.g of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals that a cor-
porate tax resulted from sale by stockholders of property distributed as a dividend
after the corporation hand conducted sale negotiations. The reversal was grounded upon
failure to raise the point before the Board, but the opinion significantly (see Hormel
v. 1lelvering, 6r Sup. Ct. 719 (r941)) added that the court below "made an inference of
fact directly in conflict with the stipulation of the parties and the findings, for which
we think the record affords no support whatsoever". That the result should depend on
whether the stockholders were bound to complete the corporate bargain was recognized
in Chisholm v. Commissioner, 79 F. (2d) 14, 16 (C. C. A. 2d, I935), cert. denied, 296
U. S. 641, and Starr v. Commissioner, 8z F. (2d) 964, 968 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936), cert.
denied, 298 U. S. 68o. See also Towne. c aL, Ex'rs. 35 B. T. A. 141 (1936), and
cases cited note 89 infra. But cf. Embry Realty Co. v. Glenn, 1i6 F. (2d) 682 (C. C.
A. 6th, i94o).
88. Trippett, 41 B. T. A. i25.4 (1940), aff'd, C. C. A. 5th, April r, 1941. But here
the corporate steps were not ncticulous!y carried out before the closing; the property
was not properly distributed aniong all the stockholders and the negotiating stock-
holders were offcers and directors. Cf. Trafford Oil & Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 78
F. (2d) 814 (C. C. A. 3d, '935).
89. See Falcon Co.. 4z B. T. A. ri2, (040) ; Fruit Belt Telephone Co., 22 B. T.
A. 44o (1930) ; NV. P. Fo. & Sons, Inc., i5 B. T. A. H5 (1929) ; Jemison, 3 B. T. A.
78 0 (1-6) ; cases citcd ntote 87 supra; G. C. M. 714. V-2 Cu.t. Buu.- 72 (1926) ; cf.
Sread v. Elmore, 59 F. (2d) 312 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932) ; Iowa Bridge Co. v. Commis-
silrier, 39 F. (2d) 777 (C. C. A. 8th, i93o).
9o. Park & Tilford, 43 B. T. A. No. 50, Jan. 16, 1941; T. H. Symington & Son,
Inc., 35 B. T. A. 711, 757 (1937) ; Harkness. 31 B. T. A. I oo (1935) ; Spitzer, 23
B. T. A. 776 (i93i) and cases cited; cf. Lam, 8 B. T. A. -'85 (1927) ; Johns, 9 B. T.
A. 232 (927).
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ignored,9 1 even though the debt represents items utilized in prior years
as tax deductions by the corporation in anticipation of ultimate pay-
ment.9 2  Were it not- for the sudden eruption that recently occurred in
reorganization cases 93 after long years of quiescent slumber, the ques-
tion of the tax consequences of such an assumption might comfortably
be allowed to remain at rest.94
In a sense, an assumption of debts by the stockholders in a
liquidation involves the use of assets to provide for debts; it is eco-
nomically similar, from the standpoint of the corporation, to a sale for
cash and application of the cash to the debts. 95 But even though such
an assumption were treated as the equivalent of cash payment, it would
not necessarily follow that the corporation realizes a gain when it dis-
tributes appreciated assets. If the tax cost of the assets distributed
is not less than the debts assumed, the corporation should realize no
gain because the cost of what it gives up is no less than what it re-
ceives." If the cost is less than the debts the result may be less
clear, 97 but whatever the rule it should work for a loss as well as a gain.
91. If, however, the parties themselves treat a distribution Qf property on .dissolu-
tion as pattly in payment of debt. and partly a liquidating distribution, they may be
taken at their word. See. e. g., Duram Bldg. Corp. v. Comm'r, 66 F. (2d) 253 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1933); Courier Journal Job Printing Co. v. Glenn, U. S. D. C. Ky, Feb. 20,
1941.
9z. This problem is very much alive in the case of ordinary cancellations of cor-
porate debt to stockholders for unpaid accrued interest and the like. See Helvering v.
Jane Holding Corp., iog F. (2d) 933 (C. C. A. 8th, 1Q4o), cert. denied, 310 U. S. 6s3;
Howard Paper Co., Inc., 43 B. T. A. No. 74, Feb. ix, ig4i; Beacon Auto Stores, Inc.,
4a B. T. A. 703 (1940); Darrell, Discaagc of Indebtedness and the Federal Income
Tax (i94o) 53 HARv. L. REv. 977, p96; Surrey, The Revenue Act of 1939 and the
Income Tax Treatm ent of Cancellation of Indebtedness (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 1153,
ii7o; Warren and Su-arman, Cancellation of Indebtedness and Its Tax Consequences
(1940) 40 Cot.. L REV. 1327, 1358.
93. United States v. Hcndler, 303 U. S. 564 (1938). See PAuL, REORGANIZATIONS,
STUDIFS IN FFDFRAL TAXATION, 3d Ser. (i94o) 134; Surrey, The Revenue Act of 1939
and the Assumptioa of Indebtedness on Tax-Free Exchanges (194o) So YALE L. J. x.
94. The question was raised but decided for the taxpayer in Feltex Oil Corp, B.
T. A. memo. op, Oct. Z, 194o.
95. Technically there is a difference between taking assets subject to debts in a
liquidation (even though coupled with indemnity to directors) and a sale. But for the
practical purposes of taxation,.the distinction should not he too heavily relied on. Cf.
INT. R~v. CODE §§ 112 (k) and 113 (a) (6) ; Ebert Estate, 37 B. T. A. :86 (r938) ;
Welch v. Street, C. C. A. 1st, Jan. 23, 1941: Haynes, B. T. A. memo. op, Jan. 14, 1941;
McLaughlin, 43 B. T. A. No. 7a, Feb. 4, 1941 ; U. S. Treas. Reg. iog, § 30.719-1.
95. The transaction is a single indivisible one; and it would therefore be unsound
to say thl-t a fraction of each asset was sold and a fraction distibnted in liquidation so
as to produce a taxable corporate gain imeasured by that proportion of the indebtedness
assum,.d which the appreciation in value of all assets bears to their present market
value. Cf. Fincke, 39 B. T. A. 5io (1939), A. A939-2 Cu.s. BULL. 12 (prior non-
acquziescLnce revoked) ; Smithers, B. T. A. memo. op., July 14, 1939; Perrin, B. T. A.
mcno. op., July I5, 1939; I. T. 3335, 1939-2 Cu f. BULL 193, revoking I. T. 268i, XII-,
Cumr. BULL 93 (1933). Cf. also ielvering v. Midland Mutual Life Insurance Co., 300
U. S. 216, 222-226 (i937).
97. The assumption rarely takes the form of a capital contribution by stockholders,
and in substance the corporation is not being built up but torn down. By the liquida-
tion the corporation gives tip all that it has, yet it is relieved of a debt which it could
have paid.
926 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
III. LIQUIDATION OF SUBSIDIARIES UNDER SECTION 112(b)(6)
Following the elimination after 1933 of consolidated income tax
returns for ordinary business corporations and the adoption of the
principle of taxing intercompany dividends, many corporate interests,
although desiring to simplify their corporate structures through elimina-
tion of subsidiaries, found it too burdensome to do so. In order to
encourage such simplification and the elimination of holding com-
panies, 98 Congress came to their relief with Section I 12(b) (6)99
which provides for the nonrecognition 100 of gain or loss to the parent
on the liquidation of a subsidiary under certain prescribed conditions,
and if the liquidation is pursuant to a plan under which it is completed
within four years commencing with the year in which the first distribu-
tion thereunder is made. Nonrecognition does not, however, extend
to minority stockholders; they remain subject to Section i 15(c).101
Section 112(b)(6) as originally enacted in i935 promised to
afford some relief, but, in many instances, there were obstacles to pro-
ceeding under it. 'In the Revenue Act of 1936, important changes 102
were made to bring the statute to its present form, resulting in a sub-
stantial increase in the utility of the section.10 3 A brief sketch of the
principal changes may serve as an aid in understanding it.
BASIS OF THE ASSETS: Under the 1935 Act, the assets of the sub-
sidiary would have taken a basis in the hands of the parent equivalent
to the basis of the parent's investment in the subsidiary, increased by
the amount of any money received and decreased by the amount of
any gain recognized on the transaction. This would have involved
complicated questions of apportionment, with sometimes anomalous
results especially as to inventory and accounts receivable. Under the
amended Act, it is expressly provided that the basis of the property
98. Senate Finance Comnmittee Hearings, July 30 to August 8, 1935, 51-52; 79
CONG. Rrc. (i935) 13722, 14864; H. R. REP. No. i885, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. (1935)
8-1o.
99. The original provision, § xio of the Revenue Act of 1935, was a conference
revision of an amendment proposed on the floor of the Senate.
ioo. Where parent or subsidiary is a foreign corporation, a prior clearance with
the Commissioner may be required. See I-NT. REv. COF § 112 (i) and PAUL, REOR-
GANIZATIONS, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION, 3d Ser. (1040) 33-36.
1o1. An exception is recognized where the minority stcrckholders, instead of receiv-
ing ordinary liquidating distributions, exchange their securities for securities of the
parent corporation pursuant to a reorganization. See U. S. Treas. Reg. io3,
§ 19.112 (b) (6)-i (containing illustration involving statutory merger). The dual
capacity of ite transaction involves no conflict under the present basis provisions.
1o2. Subdivisions (b) (6), (c) (I) and (e) of § 112 were imended; and in § 113,
a new !subdivisi-n (a) (i5) was added and subdivision (6) was amended. The pur-
pose was further to facilitate simplification of corporate structures. 80 CONG. Rw.
(1936) 9038, IO2S, 10452. H. R. REP. No. 3068, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 7-8.
1o3. The effect of a § 112 (b) (6) liquidation upon invested capital for excess
profits tax purposes should not be overlooked. § 718 (a) (5) and (b) (4), Second Rev-
enue Act of 1940.
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received by the parent shall be the same as it was in the hands of the
subsidiary.10 4  This change greatly simplifies the problems as to
basis, 10 5 as well as certain other problems hereinafter discussed2 0 '
TREATMENT OF MONEY: The 1935 Act required the recognition
of gain from a Section 12(b) (6) liquidation in an amount not in
excess of the sum of money received by the parent, and provided for
the nonrecognition of any loss. As a practical and administrative
matter, this requirement had disadvantages. Few subsidiaries are com-
pletely stripped of cash or its equivalent at the time of liquidation.
No matter how small the sum of money, calculations would have been
required as to the parent's basis, the value of the assets and the gain
or loss, in order to determine the amount of gain to be recognized and
the basis of the assets for future purposes. The burden of making.
these calculations in many instances would have far exceeded any bene-
fits to the revenue. With the change in the law to provide that the
parent should take over the assets at the subsidiary's tax basis, it was
logical to provide for full nonrecognition of gain even.though money
was received,107 for the gain from the sale of the subsidiary's property
would be the same whether the property were sold and converted into
io4. INT. REv. CODE § ix3 (a) (x5). An election was provided for liquidations
during the overlapping period.
1o5. The wisdom of the change has been questioned (Johnson, Tax-Free Liquida-
tion: Loophole and Trap (1937) x5 TAx MAG. 1), but it has much to support it. Al-
though the parent may decide whether or not to utilize § 112 (b) (6) (and parentheti-
cally it is not always easy to avoid it), there must be some fixed rule if non-taxable
liquidations are to be permitted. Whatever rule is adopted, in some cases the Treasury
would benefit and in others the parent. The continuity of basis rule is more simple
and practical, and is consistent with the post-i928 consolidated return treatment of in-
tercompany liquidations.
io6. But problems still remain. For example, if the subsidiary holds indebted-
ness of the parent at a basis of less th-n face value and the debt is cancelled in the
liquidation, there is the question whether the parent is taxable on the excess of face
value over basis under United States v. Kirby Lumber Company, 284 U. S. I (1931),
on the theory either (i) that it constitutes "property" received by the parent at the
subsidiary's basis or (2) that it is not "property" received by the parent to which
§ 112 (b) (6) alone applies. The Treasury Regulations under § 112 (b) (6) are silent
on this point, but the analogous Regulations under Supplement R, dealing with inter-
company transfers and liquidations in obedience to orders of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, state that gain is to be recognized in such situations. U. S.
Treas. Reg. 103, §§ 19.371-I, 19.371-5. The thought was that Congress intended to
postpone and not to eliminate tax. See Darrell, Discharge of Indebtedness and the
Federal Incoine Tax (i94o) 53 HARv. L. REv. 9 1-7 0oo.
Another problem is that of a subsidiary's dividends paid credit for distributions
in a § 112 (b) (6) liquidation. This problem, which first arose under the late undis-
tributed profits tax law and still exists for personal holding companies, was obviously
destined for the courts. See U. S. Treas. leg. io1 (1936), Art. 27 (f)-, continued
in U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19 27 (g)-1; I-xT. REv. CODE § 115 (h) as amended by the
Revenue Act of 1938; Centennial Oil Co. v. Thomas, io9 F. (2d) 359 (C. C. A. 5th,
194o), cert. denied, 3o9 U. S. 69o. Contra: Credit Alliance Corp., 42 B. T. A. 10o
(940), on appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, followed
by the Board in at least nine subsequent decisions.
io7. The x936 Act deleted from § 112 (b) (6) of the 1935 Act the clause "(other
than money)", which had been inserted in that Act after it was originally proposed.
Cf. Conference Committee Report on the Revenue Bill of 1935, i939-2 Cum. Bu.
66o, 662 (Part 2). It also deleted all reference to subdivision (b) (6) from the
"boot" provisions, subdivisions (c) (t) and (e).
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cash by the subsidiary prior to liquidation or by the parent after the
liquidation. In so doing, there was no need to go the full length of
providing for nonrecognition where the assets of the subsidiary consist
entirely of cash, for the transaction in such a case is essentially a closed
one. But there is nothing in the language or history of the statute,
though there may be in its underlying purpose, to justify a distinc-
tion. 08
DATE AS OF WHICH STOCK OWNERSHIP IS REQUIRED: Under the
1935 Act, no liquidation under Section I 12(b) (6) was possible unless
the parent had the necessary control over the subsidiary on August 30,
1935, the date of enactment of the Act. This greatly limited the sec-
tion's applicability for, where the parent had less than the necessary
percentage of stock ownership, or where in the more intricate cor-
porate structures there were sub-subsidiaries with control divided
among various members of the group, there was no way in which a
liquidation could have been effected under the section. The 1936 Act
substituted the requirement that the prescribed percentage of stock be
held at the time of adoption of the plan of liquidation. This makes
it possible for a parent to acquire such additional stock in the sub-
sidiary, or to effect such transfers of stock between various companies
in the group, as may be necessary to meet the stock ownership require-
ments. The parent may further increase its holding after the adoption
of the plan, but may not decrease it.
PERCENTAGE OF STOCK OWNERSHIP REQUIRED: Subsidiaries com-
monly have nonvoting preferred stock outstanding. Under the 1935
Act such subsidiaries could not have been liquidated under Section
112(b) (6). Under the present Act, however, they can be, because
under the revised definition of control it is not necessary for the parent
to own any of the subsidiary's nonvoting stock which is limited and
preferred as to dividends. The parent must own stock possessing at
least eighty per cent of the total combined voting power of all stock
entitled to vote, and the same percentage of all classes of nonvoting
stock except such limited preferred stock.
A. Liquidation by Means of a Statutory Merger
Under general corporation law and the state statutes a merger is
not usually considered to be a liquidation; in a liquidation a corpora-
zo& G. C. M. 19435, 1938-I CuM. BUU. 176, specifically rules that § 11 (b) (6)
applies even though the subsidiary's assets consist entirely of cash. Cf. Portland Oil
Co., 1O9 F. (2d) 479 (C. C. A. Ist, 1940), cert. denied, 310 U. S. 65o (money treated
as "property" under another nonrecognition provision) ; Halliburton v. Commissioner,
78 F. (2d) 265 (C. C. A. 9th, '935); Eaton, 37 B. T. A. 715 (x938).
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tion is customarily put to death completely, while in a merger it is
united with another and the two continue as one. However, it is a
familiar principle of tax law, expressly recognized in Section
112(b) (6), that the characterization of an act or transaction under
state law does not necessarily govern; and, in the case of a merger of a
subsidiary into the parent, the substance from a tax standpoint is very
much like a liquidation."0 9 .Liquidation by statutory merger is ex-
pressly recognized in the Treasury Regulations, 1 and it is sometimes
preferable to the ordinary liquidation procedure.11
B. Distributions in Kind
Section 112(b) (6) deals with a liquidation fromi the standpoint.
of the controlling stockholder. Gain or loss to the subsidiary is left
to be determined wholly outside of that section. However, it is hardly
conceivable that any question of gain or loss to the subsidiary upon
distribution of property in kind could ordinarily arise under a statute
which requires the distributee to take over the subsidiary's basis for
the property.11 2 The Congressional intention is clear that the apprecia-
tion should be taxed when ihe property is disposed of by the dis-
tributee; it iould not have been intended to tax it twice.
C. Indebtediwss of Subsidiary
A liquidation under Section 112(b) (6), involving, as it normally
does, a transfer rather than a winding up of the subsidiary's business,
is markedly similar in many respects to a reorganization in which the
basis of the transferor's assets continues in the hands of the transferee,
and the effect of an assumption of debts by the transferee in connection
therewith should be governed by the same rule. Ve have recently
witnessed the sudden emergence of the assumption of debt problem in
connection with corporate reorganizations, and a quick statutory
cure; I1s but the statutory cure was not extended to cover liquidations
under Section 112(b)(6). If the assumption or cancellation of in-
debtedness by the parent is ignored from the standpoint of both gain
to the subsidiary and basis of the assets to the parent, the continued
1o9. Cf. Frelmort Realty Corp., 29 B. T. A. i8i (1933). Here, however, before
the merger, the business assets had been sold.
zio. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.112 (b) (6)-1.
iii. For ex.mple, a parent becoming liable on a subsidiary's bonds pursuant to
statutory merger could continue to amortize the subsidiary's bond discount and ex-
pense for tax purposes, whereas in a straight liquidation the benefit of the deductions
would probably forever be lost. Helvering v. Metropolitan Edison Co., Helvering v.
Pennsylvania Water & Power Co., 306 U. S. 522 (1939); General Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Commissioner, 3o6 U. S. 530 (1939), and cases cited.
112. Even the distribution of installment obligations gives rise to no immediate
tax. I N. RsY. CoDE §44 (d).
ix3. Revenue Act of 1939 §213; see note 92 jupra.
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operation or subsequent sale of the property, whether to pay the sub-
sidiary's debts or otherwise, would result in the same gain or loss as
if the liquidation had not occurred. On the other hand, if the assump-
tion or cancellation is considered a taxable transaction to the subsidiary,
not only would the benefits of Section 112(b) (6) be largely lost but
the present basis provision 114 would produce a distortion. It seems
quite unlikely Congress could have intended any such result.118
CONCLUSION
The place of the corporation in a sound income tax system has
long been a perplexing problem. At one extreme is the view that as
the creature of its stockholders it should occupy a relatively non-taxed
status similar to that of a partnership under present law, the stock-
holders being currently taxed on the co;porate income but not on
transfers to and from the corporation. At the other extreme is the
view that, as a deep-rooted, powerful business institution in American
life, insulated from its stockholders, it should be regarded as a fully
taxable entity quite distinct from its owners, all income transactions
between them being taxable to both. And between these two poles are
varying climates of opinion,"16 influenced in varying degrees by prac-
tical, constitutional, social and political considerations.
Congress has struck a middle course.1"" But during recent years
the exceptions to the full taxability of corporation-stockholder transac-
114. Unlike reorganizations, the carried-forward basis of the assets to the parent
transferee is not adjusted for gain recognized to the transferor. INT. REV. CODE
§113 (a) (s).
I5. Where, however, the debts of the subsidiary equal or exceed the value of its
assets, it is arguable that § 112 (b) (6) is inapplicable because all the assets are
received by the parent in payment, or in consideration for the assumption, of the debts,
and not as a distribution "in complete cancellation or redemption" of the subsidiary's
stock. To take this position, despite the transfer of assets and cancellation of stock,
-would be to limit the benefits of § 112 (b) (6) to liquidations of solvent subsidiaries.
If the assumption or cancellation of a subsidiary's debts is to be ignored in the or-
dinary case, it probably should also be ignored in the extreme case of insolvency.
1i6. Cf. TWENTIETH CENTU-RY FuND, FA.,IiNG THE TAX PROBLEM (1937Y 429
et scq.; DEXNNIsON, FH.ENE, FLAxoeas and LEEDS, TOWARD FuLL EMPLOYMENT
(1939) 233.
17. To illustrate: Assets may be transferred to a corporation for stock and
securities without immediate recognition of gain or loss to the transferors if their
proportionate interests in the property remain the same. IxT. R m . CODE § 112 (b) (5)-
Despite many attempts to change it, ordinary corporate dividends out of assets in
excess of capital are not taxable dividends except to the extent of earnings or profits
accumulated since February 28, 1913. INr. RRV. CoDE § 115 (a) to (d). A corpora-
tion may transfer its assets to another for the latter's stock and securities and at
as-umption of debt and then be dissolved, and, unlike an individual, gain or loss to il
is forever ignored; the transferee steps into its tax shoes and recognition of gain oj
loss to its stockholders is postponed. Ir. REv. CODE § 112, subsection (b) (3) and
(4), (g) and (k) ; INr. REv. Con § 113 (a) (6) and (7). And 8o% controlled sub-
sidiaries may be liquidated tax free. INT. REv. CODE § 112 (b) (6). Cf. TAxAToIO
OF CORPORATE ENTERPRIsE, TNEC MoN. No. 9, Sen. Comm. Print, 76th Cong., 3rd
Sess. (1940).
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tions have been increasingly narrowed by legislative "Is and judicial 119
action. As regards corporate liquidations, the tax problems from the
standpoint of the liquidating corporation are as yet in some respects
only incipient. Our recent experience with assumptions of debt in cor-
porate reorganizations tells us, however, that assumptions in Section
I 12(b) (6) liquidations should.receive similar legislative attention, lest
the situation get out of hand. At the same time, liquidation of sub-
sidiaries whose assets consist entirely of cash might be excluded from
that section as closed transactions.
A fully satisfactory treatment of liquidations from the standpoint
of taxing the stockholders is much more difficult to find. In a liquida-
tion a stockholder gets cash or property in substitution for his stock;
in this respect the transaction is similar to a sale. Yet the cash or
property may be partly made up of accumulated corporate earnings
which if distributed before liquidation would have been fully taxable
dividends; in this sense the distribution when postponed until liquida-
tion bears a resemblance to a dividend. Congress, after vacillating
between these two approaches, has in recent years leavened the statute
with both of them, in a.desire to do something about the perennial
problem of avoidance of surtax on accumulated corporate earnings, a
problem that is one of the most troublesome in tax law.
To tax liquidating distributions out of earnings as ordinary divi-
dends, 120 as under the earlier law, has a theoretical appeal, but it would
hardly accomplish a desirable result. Though protecting against loss
of surtax on accumulated earnings, it would tend, because of the con-
centration of distributions in the liquidation period, to produce a
greater surtax out of earnings, although legitimately accumulated, than
if the stockholders had been currently taxed; and, to attempt, as in the
Revenue Act of 1917, to relate the tax to the rates in effect when the
earnings were made would create insuperable administrative difficulties.
Moreover, though occasional hardships must be anticipated, it would
have the unfortunate effect in many cases of placing the dividend tax
burden upon taxpayers other than those-perhaps in different surtax
brackets-who, as the rbal beneficiaries of the earnings accumulation,
should bear it, for it would disregard the practical fact that, in these
days of publicly owned corporations and freely transferable stock, it
is more usual than occasional that the stockholders at the time of
18. For example: The corporate tax rate is no longer maintained at a rate
roughly comparable to that of the individual'normal tax with dividends exempt from
normal tax. Intercompany dividends are no longer wholly exempt from tax. And
the reorganization provisions of the statute are not now as widely applicable as once
they were. See PAUL, STUDIFS I. FFDERAL TAXATON, 3d Ser. (194o) 3.
Izg. Cf. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465 (x935)'; Higgins v. Smith, 3o8
U. S. 473 (i94o).
i2o. Favored in Note (i9?6) 49 HAiv. L. REv. 1344, 1350.
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the liquidation were not the stockholders throughout; they may have
bought at a price that took into account the accumulated earnings.121
And finally, apart from the administrative problem of ascertaining
accumulated earnings in almost every case entailing tax uncertainties
for the stockholders, it would have the anomalous result, such as
existed under earlier law, that comes from dividing a single liquidation
transaction into both a taxable dividend and a capital gain or loss, each
subject to different tax treatment.
The present hybrid treatment of liquidations seems more practical
and preferable, 122 especially as dividends are no longer exempt from
normal tax. As we have seen, a stockholder's loss is treated in all
respects as derived from a sale, and so also is his gain if it is from a
complete liquidation qualifying under Section i 15(c). But otherwise
his entire gain (not necessarily the amount he receives out of earn-
ings), whether due to accumulation of earnings, appreciation in value
of corporate property, or even to the fact that he obtained his stock at
a low price during depressed market conditions, is deemed a short-term
capital gain taxable in full. This unfavorable distinction between the
treatment of long-term liquidation gains 123 and similar gains derived
from sales had its genesis in the legislative concern over surtax avoid-
ance, of which we have spoken. Yet it is a fair question whether on
balance the surtax protection actually attained warrants the cost, for
sales at a profit are as much due to accumulated earnings as are liquida-
tion gains, and the statute, favoring the former, hits out indiscrim-
inately against the latter in an effort to erect safeguards which, if not
wholly ineffectual due to increase in basis of the stock through pur-
chase or inheritance or the adoption of a complete liquidation plan, can
often be easily avoided by sale of the stock before redemption.
124
As to complete liquidations, closely held corporations, where sur-
tax avoidance more likely lurks, can usually be comfpletely wound up
within four years, enabling the stockholders to treat their gains in all
respects as sales; while publicly held corporations frequently find it
much more difficult to do so. The four-year limitation, viewed
realistically, discriminates between complete liquidations on a basis
quite unrelated as a practical matter to surtax avoidance, has a natural
tendency to color business judgment by tax considerations, and places
12r. A dividend is still a dividend though the corporate surplus out of which it
was paid was there when the stock was bought. United States v. Phellis, 257 U. S.
156, 171 (192i) ; Neptune Meter Co. v. Price, 98 F. (2d) 76 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
122. See Note (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1146, 1163.
123. It may be noted that a distribution from capital under Code § iiS (d) is
taxable to the extent it exceeds basis of the stock in the same manner as a gain from
a sale, special provision for surtax protection being unnecessary since the section does
not apply to liquidations or where post-19I3 earnings are available for distribution.
124. Seaholm, B. T. A. memo. op. June 15; 1939; cf. McKee, 35 B. T. A. a39
(x97).
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the stockholder in many instances in the unhappy position of uncer-
tainty until some future year over the tax consequences of intermediate
distributions in excess of his tax basis. Still, the requirement of a
definite liquidation plan may tend to reduce the fruitful field of contro-
versy over liquidation status, and a forceful argtiment can be made for
denying any advantage from an unnecessary continuance of that status
indefinitely.
Much less can be said in favor of the present iron-clad discrimina-
tion against long-term gains in partial liquidation. Such gains are
either not attributable to accumulation of earnings at all, or as we have
observed, if attributable thereto, are no more so than similar gains
derived from sales which are given favored treatment. Mforeovef, the
statute serves more as a trap for the unwary than as an effective revenue
measure. In fact, in its seeming unfairness and its open invitation, to
taxpayers to change the tax consequences by sale before liquidation.to
outsiders, 125 it encourages tax-finessing tendencies which in any self-
assessing income tax system ought if possible to be avoided. The re-
sults achieved in surtax protection seem hardly to justify the hardships
and discriminations it creates and the unhealthy .tendencies it stimu-
lates. Surtax avoidance peculiar to partial liquidations had better be
remedied by more effective enforcement of the principles of Section
115(g).
If the broad problem of surtax avoidance on corporate earnings
is to be solved at all, it should be attacked directly and at once, and not
unrealistically by singling out liquidations and postponing retribution
until the end with poor results. Conceding the tremendous difficulties
and differences of opinion regarding choice of method, the aim should
be to frustrate surtax avoidance as it occurs during corporate existence,
and to. do it at the expense of those who stood to gain. As measures
of this character are developed and become more efficient, it is to be
hoped that Congress will see fit to revert to the practical policy in force
between 1924 and 1934 of treating liquidation gains and losses whole-
heartedly like sales.
t25. Particlilarly in re, .i,,s of preferred stock, a common commercial prac-
tice has grown up of advance selling purely for tax purposes.
